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Abstract:  Incidents due to malfunctioning medical devices are a major cause of serious injury and death in the 
United States. During 2006–2011, 5,294 recalls and around 1.2 million adverse events were reported to the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Almost 23% of these recalls were due to computer-related failures, of which 
around 94% presented medium-to-high risk of severe health consequences (such as serious injury or death) to 
patients. This paper investigates the causes of failures in computer-based medical devices and their impact on 
patients, by analyzing human-written descriptions of recalls and adverse event reports, obtained from public FDA 
databases. We characterize computer-related failures by deriving fault classes, failure modes, recovery actions, and 
number of devices affected by the recalls. This analysis is used as a basis for identifying safety issues in life-critical 
medical devices and providing insights on the future challenges in the design of safety-critical medical devices.  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Electronic and computer-based devices are being widely deployed in clinical and personalized settings, 
facilitated by shrinking technologies, portability, and increasing interconnectedness. With ease of 
deployment comes significant increase in device complexity and major challenges in reliability, patient 
safety, and security. Medical devices are often subject to a non-negligible number of failures with 
potentially catastrophic impact on patients. During 2006-2011 a total of 5,294 recalls and 1,154,451 
adverse events were reported to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). As shown in Figure 1, 
since 2006 an overall increase of 69.8% in the number of recalls and 103.3% in the number of adverse 
events (reaching about 1,190 recalls, 92,600 patient injuries, and 4,590 deaths in 2011) is observed.  
 
In this study, we focus on Computer-related Recalls related to failures of computer-based medical 
devices. During our measurement period, the number of computer-related recalls almost doubled, 
reaching an overall number of 1,210 (22.9% of all recalls) as shown in Figure 1.a. A previous study 
conducted during the 6-year period of 1999-2005, attributed 1,261 (33.4%) recalls to software-based 
medical devices [1].  Our goal is to identify the major causes of Computer-related Failures in medical 
devices that impact patient safety. We define Computer-related Failure as any event causing a computer-
based medical device to function improperly or present harm to patients/users, due to failures in any of 
the following components of the device: software, hardware, I/O, or battery. Other failures of computer-
based devices that could not be easily categorized in these four classes are classified in other category. 
 
The data is collected from two public FDA databases: Medical and Radiation Emitting Device Recalls 
database and Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (Adverse Event Reports) database [2].  
In-depth study of recall data allows us to characterize the computer-related failures based on Fault Class: 
the defective components that led to device failures; Failure Mode: the impact of failures on the safe 
functioning of the devices; Recovery Action Category: the types of actions taken by manufacturers to 
address the recalls; Number of Recalled Devices: the quantities of recalled devices distributed in the 
market; and Device Category: the categories and types of recalled devices.  We use the overall number of 
devices that are affected by each recall, as a metric to measure the impact of failures. 
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We specifically focus on Safety-critical Recalls that include (i) recalls classified by FDA as Class I, 
presenting a high likelihood of severe injury or death to patients; (ii) recalls for which the Reason for 
Recall field specifically indicated a patient safety issue such as injury or death; and (iii) recalls for which 
the Reason for Recall field explicitly indicated potential of exposing patients/users to immediate 
“Physical Safety Hazards” such as “overdose”, “overexposure”, “electrical shock”, “burning”, and 
“fire” (classified under “Physical Safety Hazard” failure mode).  
 
Safety-critical recalls are used as a basis to find categories and types of Safety-critical Medical Devices, 
whose failures will most likely lead to life-critical consequences for patients. Analysis of adverse event 
reports allows us to measure the impact of device failures in terms of actual adverse consequences (e.g., 
serious injuries or deaths) reported to the FDA. Finally, based on specific safety issues identified for life-
critical medical devices, we discuss the challenges in design of next-generation medical devices. 
 
 
II. DATA SOURCES 
 
The FDA regulates medical devices sold in the U.S by requiring manufacturers to follow a set of 
premarket and postmarket regulatory controls. Medical devices are classified by the FDA into 5,853 
distinct types and 19 medical specialties (or categories) such as Anesthesiology, Cardiovascular, Clinical 
Chemistry, General Hospital, General Surgery, and Radiology, indicating their regulatory class and 
marketing requirements. After a medical device is distributed in the market, the FDA monitors reports of 
adverse events and other problems with the device and alerts health professionals and the public, when 
needed, to ensure proper use of the devices and safety of patients.  
 
The Recalls database is a public database of classified medical device recalls since November 1, 2002. A 
recall is a voluntary action taken by a company (manufacturer, distributor, or other responsible party) to 
correct or remove from the market any medical devices that violate the laws administrated by the FDA. 
Recalls are initiated to protect the public health and well-being from devices that are defective or present 
a risk to health such as disease, injury, or death. In rare cases, if the company fails to voluntarily recall a 
device that presents a health risk, the FDA may issue a recall order to the manufacturer. The FDA reviews 
recalls and classifies them into three classes based on the relative degree of health hazard presented by the 
device. A recall is classified as Class I when there is a reasonable chance that use of the device will cause 
serious adverse health problems or death. Class II recalls are related to devices that may cause temporary 
or medically reversible adverse health consequences, or pose a remote chance of serious health problems. 
Class III recalls are related to devices that violate the laws but are not likely to cause adverse health 
consequences. 
 
The Adverse Event Reports (MAUDE) database is the collection of adverse events of medical devices 
reported to the FDA by volunteers, user facilities, manufacturers, and distributors. FDA regulations 
require firms that receive complaints to notify the FDA of medical device incidents, including device 
malfunctions, serious injuries, and deaths associated with devices. Not all reported adverse events lead to 
recalls; manufacturers and the FDA monitor adverse events to detect and correct the problems in a timely 
manner.  
 
The Total Product Life Cycle (TPLC) database [2] integrates premarket data on medical devices 
including Device Classifications, Premarket Approvals (PMA), and Premarket Notifications (510(k)) with 
postmarket data including Adverse Events and Recalls. Each record provides the premarket review 
information for a device type and a list of adverse events and recalls reported for devices of that type.  
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III. SAFETY-CRITICAL COMPUTER-RELATED RECALLS 
 
Data Analysis Flow 
Step 1) Figure 1.c shows the overall analysis flow, which started with extraction of 13,413 recall records 
from the database, reported to the FDA from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2011. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - (a) Total Number of Recalls per Year (2006-2011): Computer-related and Non-Computer-related,  
(b) Total Number of Adverse Events (2006-2011): Malfunctions, Deaths, and Injuries (Numbers on the bars indicate number 
of deaths in thousands per year), (c) Methodology for Analysis of Safety-Critical Computer-related Recalls. 
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Step 2) We identified the computer-related recalls by analysis of the Reason for Recall and Action fields 
of records in the FDA recalls database. Those fields contain human-written unstructured text explaining 
the main reason for the recall and recovery actions taken by the manufacturer to address the recall. Many 
of the recall records have the same reasons because the same component or part is used in different 
devices or models manufactured by the same company. After eliminating the duplicate values in the list 
of Reasons for Recalls (using Microsoft Excel feature for removing duplicate rows in a sheet), we came 
up with 5,294 unique Recall Events or what we refer to as Recalls in the FDA database.  
Step 3) Using Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK), we extracted the most frequently used nouns and 
adjectives in human-written Reason for Recall fields. This list was then reviewed to create a ranked 
dictionary of 461 common computer-related keywords that could potentially represent failures of 
computer-based devices. The list of computer-related keywords was further categorized into the classes of 
Software, Hardware, Battery, Input/Output (I/O), and Other, corresponding to defects in different 
components of the device. 
 
Step 4) We used the extracted dictionary to identify computer-related recalls by searching for keywords 
in Reason for Recall descriptions. That led us to a reduced list of 4,200 potential computer-related recalls, 
whose corresponding recall records were manually reviewed for validation and further categorization.  
 
Step 5) In the manual review, we excluded many of the records from the list of computer-related recalls 
because their Product Name, Reason for Recall and Action fields did not indicate a computer-based 
device recall. The final list of computer-related recalls included 1,116 unique recall events. 
 
Step 6) We also found 94 additional computer-related recalls reported because of software errors 
(software-related recalls) that were missed in our reason analysis process because the human-written 
explanations of reasons did not include any terms from the dictionary related to computers. We extracted 
these additional recalls by searching  for the terms 'software', 'version', and 'release' in the Product Name 
field and terms 'software', 'update', and 'upgrade' in the Action fields. 
 
Step 7) Through manual review of the computer-related recalls, we extracted Fault Class, Failure Mode, 
Recovery Action Category, and Number of Recalled Devices for each recall.  The number of recalled 
devices was calculated by summing up the quantities listed in the recall records related to each recall 
event. For example, in Figure 2.b the fourth recall event was reported in five records in the recalls 
database, which together affected a total number of 7,152 devices on the market. In some instances where 
the total number was entered in all the recall records related to a recall event, we only counted it once. 
 
Step 8) We used the FDA TPLC database which integrates the information such as device name, type, 
category (medical specialty), and regulatory class of recalled devices with a subset (3,676) of recall 
records. We extracted that information for 794 of computer-related recalls in our study and then used it as 
a training set for finding the names, types, and categories of the rest of computer-related recalls. 
 
Finally, we ended up with a total of 1,210 computer-related recalls that affected an overall number of 
12,024,836 devices distributed in the U.S. and worldwide. The 1,210 recalls were used as the basis for 
deriving statistics on Fault Classes, Failure Modes, and Recovery Actions of computer-related failures 
(next section), to identify safety-critical medical devices, their specific safety issues, and patient impacts 
(Section IV), and to provide insights on the challenges in design of next-generation medical devices 
(Section V).  
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Figure 2 - (a) Right: Example Dictionary Keywords, Left: Distribution of Computer-related Recalls in Fault Classes & Risk Levels  
(b) Example Computer-related Recalls 
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Data Analysis Results 
1) Fault Classes:  Figure 2.a (right) lists example keywords from the dictionary used to identify 
computer-related failures in each fault class. The “Software” class represents failures due to software 
errors. The “Hardware” category includes both electrical issues and defects of internal circuits, while the 
“Input/Output (I/O)” category includes failures due to sensors, connections, display, or speakers. The 
“Battery” category represents defects in batteries, power cords, or power supply units that might cause 
interruption/failure of computer-based device function or cause harm to patients. “Battery” failures were 
included as computer-related failures because a typical safety-critical computer system should be able to 
detect, respond, and manage such failures and prevent harm to patients. The “Other” category includes 
recalls whose descriptions indicate a computer-related failure, but are not sufficient to be categorized in 
any of the above categories. Figure 2.b shows example recall records categorized in each fault class.  
Figure 2.a (left) illustrates the distribution of recalls across different fault classes and recall classes (risk 
classes). The last column of the table shows the total number of devices on the market affected by the 
recalls in each fault class.  
• Note that all Class I recalls are classified as safety-critical according to criterion (i) in Section I. Our 
analysis shows among Class I recalls, 42 were due to computer-related failures (Figure 2.a, column 2). 
Software failures accounted for 33.3% (14) of Class I recalls, while Hardware (8), Other (10), Battery 
(8), and I/O (2) combined were the reason for 66.7%. Clearly, a non-negligible fraction of computer-
related recalls are due to non software-related failures.  
 
• Majority (90.5%) of computer-related recalls were classified by FDA as Class II, with a medium risk 
of health consequences. Of these, we classified 66 to be safety-critical based on criterion (ii) for safety-
critical recalls in Section I. In each case the manufacturer’s description explicitly indicated that the 
device failure resulted in or had the potential to result in a patient safety issue, injury, or death. 
 
• When we simply look at the overall number of recalls, similar to what other studies (e.g., [1][3][4]) 
reported, software is a major cause (14.7%) of the total recalls. Additionally, 64.3% of computer-
related recalls are due to software failures. However, we get a very different perspective by 
considering the total number of devices on the market that were impacted by specific recall types 
(software, hardware, other, battery, and I/O). This analysis can be derived from the last column of 
Figure 2.a. If we look at the total number of devices, hardware-related recalls had a larger impact 
(almost 84% more) compared to software. Of all the recalled devices on the market, 57.3% were 
recalled because of hardware, battery, or I/O failures, and only 19.2% because of software faults.   
 
2) Failure Modes: To show the breadth of failures that might impact the safe functioning of a computer-
based medical device, we group the failures under six different categories shown in Table I (upper part). 
Number of recalls in different FDA recall classes categorized in each failure mode along with example 
failures of each category is shown in the table. For example, 84 of 1,210 computer-related recalls were 
due to failures affecting the alarm functionality of the device and were grouped under “Alarm/Message 
Error” category.   
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Table I - Computer-related Failure Modes and Recovery Action Categories in Medical Devices 
Failure 
Mode 
Recalls 
Count 
Example Failures 
Example Safety-Critical Recalls 
 
Recall 
Class R
ec
al
l 
C
la
ss
 
Recall Record Number: 
Reason for Recall Summary 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
I II III 
Alarm/ 
Message 
Error 
4 76 4 
- Alarm reset 
- Lack of audible alarms 
- Missed alarms 
- Unexpected/false alarms 
I 
Z-0051-2012: Pumps stop infusing, 
backup alarm sounds; but the "Run" 
LEDs advance as if the pumps were 
infusing.  
(i) 
Physical 
Safety  
Hazard 
2 89 0 
- Electrical shock 
- Smoke/fire/explode 
- Unintended movement 
- Overdose/over exposure 
II 
Z-0119-2009: A short-circuit (e.g. in a 
cable or the control units) can result in 
uncontrolled and unstoppable 
movement of the Video Fluoroscopy 
table. This failure might lead to serious 
deterioration in state of patient health.  
(iii) 
Display/ 
Image 
Error 
1 156 11 
- Blank image 
- Display freeze 
- Image distortion/corruption 
- Loss of image data 
I 
Z-0006-2011: Under certain wireless 
network conditions a communication 
error can occur that freezes the PC Unit 
screen. This failure may result in delay of 
therapy and serious injury or death.  
(i) 
 
(ii) 
Treatment 
Interruption/ 
Therapy 
Failure 
18 129 3 
- Delayed/failed shock delivery 
- Infusion/ventilation failure 
- Signal analysis failure 
- Loss of monitoring 
II 
Z-0689-2007: Defective integrated circuit 
board could result in loss of the system 
pump and patient injury (hot fluid 90 
degree C into uterus). 
(ii) 
Device 
Operation 
Failure 
12 234 23 
- Device inoperable 
- Failure at startup 
- Failure to stop exposure 
- Hangup/Freeze 
II 
Z-1474-2009: Unusual occurrence of 
system lockups of cardiovascular X-ray 
imaging systems causes image acquisition 
failure and user has to reset the system. 
One patient death has been reported 
related to this issue. 
(ii) 
Calculation/ 
Output 
Error 
4 311 20 
- Corrupted patient files 
- Inconsistent output 
- Incorrect calculation/display 
- Miscalculation 
I 
Z-0263-2012: Drug dosage calculation 
may indicate incorrect values; 
misalignment of ECG-ART waveforms 
was observed on the central station. 
(i) 
Recovery 
Action 
Category 
Example Recovery Actions 
R
ec
al
ls 
C
ou
nt
 
Safety 
Notification “Consignees were notified by letter on/about December 1, 2005.” 
223 Safety  
Instructions 
“In the notice letter, Agfa HealthCare is also providing customers with the recommended 
workaround. The workaround is to only print from the Viewer screen or to print the ECG once 
confirmed.  The Viewer screen, however, does not allow the user to print batches of reports as 
does the Index screen.” 
Software  
Update 
“The letters stated that the recall was to the user level and requested that the user perform the 
software upgrade, which will eliminate the possibility of shock and burn.” 632 
Repair 
“The notice asks that the customers inspect their units for signs of discoloration indicative of a 
faulty connector. The customers were instructed to return the product to CSZ for repair by 
contacting their Customer Service division and obtaining a Return Authorization number and 
specific instructions concerning packaging and returning of the unit(s) for repair.” 
95 
Replace/ 
Remove 
“The letter includes a response form, the firm's contact information, and indicates that the firm 
will exchange the recalled defibrillator with a replacement and new five (5) year warranty.” 139 
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We draw the attention to safety-critical recalls identified based on criterion (iii) of Section I. For these 91 
recalls, devices had potential to expose patients/user to immediate safety hazards (e.g., overdose, 
electrical shock, and fire), and are grouped under the “Physical Safety Hazards” failure mode. It is 
interesting that nearly all physical safety hazards were in Class II, but it is important to consider them as 
safety-critical because the manufacturer’s description explicitly indicated a possibility of immediate harm 
to patients/users. 
 
The last three columns of Table I (upper part) show example recalls in each failure mode category that are 
classified as safety-critical according to the criteria defined in Section I.  In each example, information 
used for identification of the safety-critical recall is highlighted in bold in the reason description and the 
corresponding criteria are shown in the last column. For example, the third recall is related to a hardware 
defect that might lead to loss of the system pump and injection of hot fluid into patient's uterus. Although 
this recall was classified in Class II, it was selected as a safety-critical recall by criterion (ii). 
 
For 113 of the 1,210 recalls there was not enough details on failure symptoms, or the event could not be 
classified in any of the defined failure modes. 
 
3) Recovery Actions: We classified the recovery actions taken by manufacturers to five categories shown 
in the lower part of Table I. Also Figure 2.b (column 5) shows actions taken for the example recalls. In 
the following, the denominators refer to the number of recalls/devices in the specified fault classes: 
 
• For 18.4% (223/1,210) of recalls the recovery action was limited to sending notifications to customers 
about the device problem, or providing instructions on how to avoid or workaround the problem. 
 
• The majority of computer-related recalls due to software faults (80% = 623/778) were addressed by 
releasing a new software version or software patch to fix the problem. Sending notifications or 
instructions was the next most common action to address software-related recalls (16.7% =130/778).   
 
• For hardware-related recalls, in most cases, customers were required to completely remove the device 
and/or return it to the company for replacement (36.3% = 65/179), or the device or part of it had to be 
corrected/repaired by the company (38.5% = 69/179). Interestingly, 4.5% (8/179) of hardware-related 
recalls were addressed by a software update.  
 
• Of all the devices affected by the recalls, approximately 17.8% (2,145,087/12,024,836) required 
replacement of parts or a complete removal. Additionally, the majority of these replacements were 
because of battery (52.9% = 1,135,478/2,145,087) or hardware (37.6% = 805,868/2,145,087) failures.  
 
These results show the importance of non software-related (e.g., hardware and battery) failures in terms of 
higher cost for manufacturers, caregivers, and patients. For example, for Implantable Cardioverter-
Defibrillators recalled during 1990-2000, a total cost of $870 million including device checks/analyses 
($83 million) and replacements ($787 million) was estimated [5]. These costs could be considerably 
reduced by the use of fault-tolerance techniques to enable recovery from such failures without requiring 
complete removal of the devices. 
 
For 10% (121/1,210) of the records, the Action field information was not available or sufficient to 
categorize them. 
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IV. SAFETY-CRITICAL MEDICAL DEVICES 
 
In the final stage of analysis we focused on safety-critical devices whose failures present the highest 
likelihood of severe life-critical consequences to patients (Figure 1.c, Step 9). A total of 197 (16.3%) 
computer-related recalls were identified as safety-critical, including (i) 42 Class I recalls, (ii) 66 Class II 
recalls whose Reason for Recall field specifically indicated a patient “safety” issue such as “injury” or 
“death”, and (iii) 89 Class II recalls with a “Physical Safety Hazards” failure mode. Those 197 recalls 
together affected 2,447,894 devices on the market.  
 
We found that the majority (80.7% = 159/197) of safety-critical recalls were for devices used in 
Radiology (e.g., linear accelerators), Cardiovascular (e.g., automated external defibrillators), General 
Hospital (e.g., infusion pumps), Anesthesiology (e.g., ventilators), and General Surgery (e.g. 
electrosurgical accessories). More importantly, 73.8% (31/42) of Class I recalls were for Cardiovascular 
and General Hospital devices such as defibrillators, patient monitors, and infusion pumps. Almost all 
those devices were approved by the FDA under a medium level of regulatory controls (510(k) clearance). 
 
Table II shows example types of safety-critical medical devices that were recalled because of potential 
harm to patients. The total number of computer-related recalls, safety-critical computer-related recalls, 
and example fault classes and failures for each device type were extracted from the recalls database. The 
last three columns present the number of adverse events reported for these devices in the MAUDE 
database. We obtained these numbers by searching for the devices based on their Names and Product 
Codes in the MAUDE database (Figure 1.c, Step 10). For extraction of computer-related adverse events, 
we used the Product Problems of the reports.  
 
Out of 75,267 identified computer-related adverse events, around 50% (representing 398 deaths, 18,241 
injuries, and 18,937 malfunctions) were related to the devices shown in Table II. However, our 
observation is similar to other studies ([4]) that there are inaccuracies and under-reporting in the MAUDE 
database and inconsistencies between MAUDE and Recalls databases. As an example of the 
inconsistency, we see that although safety-critical computer-related recalls affected a significant number 
of devices used in Radiology, very few severe adverse events due to computer problems could be 
identified for these devices in the MAUDE database. Nonetheless, implantable pacemakers, defibrillators, 
and infusion pumps dominate the computer-related failures (35 recalls) and fatalities (392 deaths). This 
observation can be explained by the large number of these devices in use, for treatment of critical 
conditions such as sudden cardiac arrest.  
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Table II - Safety-Critical Medical Devices:  
Computer-related Recalls (Numbers and Example Safety Issues) and Adverse Event Reports 
D
ev
ic
e 
C
at
eg
or
y 
Device Type 
(Product Codes) 
Safety Critical Computer-related Recalls 
Number of  
Computer-related 
Adverse Events 
N
um
 o
f 
R
ec
al
ls
 
N
um
 o
f 
D
ev
ic
es
 
Example 
Faults 
Classes 
Example 
Failures D
ea
th
 
In
ju
ry
 
M
al
-
fu
nc
tio
n 
R
ad
io
lo
gy
 
Linear 
Accelerator  
(IYE) 
13 4,415 
Software 
- No interlock of beam delivery 
- Unexpected gantry rotation 
- Incorrect treatment plan 
- Dose delivered to wrong location 
- Overdose  
0 0 5 
Other - Unexpected flat panel movement - Unexpected couch movement 
Image Processing 
System  
(LLZ) 
15 15,069 Software 
- Mismatched/wrong image orientation 
- Inaccurate annotation/data printed 
- Unintended images displayed 
- Incorrect/incomplete data displayed 
- Overestimated image scales 
1 0 4 
Image-Intensified  
Fluoroscopic  
X-Ray System  
(JAA) 
7 3,468 Software 
- Unexpected system lockup 
- Inaccurate detection 
- Incorrect dose exposure 
- Unstoppable X-ray exposure 
- Image storage failure 
0 1 2,186 
C
ar
di
ov
as
cu
la
r 
D
ef
ib
ril
la
to
r 
External  
(Non-
Wearable) 
(MKJ) 
17 415,537 
Hardware 
Battery 
- Delayed/failed shock delivery 
- Energy discharge failure 
16 1 281 Software - Premature shutdown - Incorrect energy/shock delivery 
Other - Unexpected power on/off 
Implantable  
(NIK/LWS/ 
MRM) 
2 170,542 Software 
- Loss of rate response 
- Premature battery depletion 
- Loss of telemetry 
- Aborted therapy 
293 14,281 11,028 
Implantable 
Pacemaker/ 
Pulse Generator 
(DXY/LWP/NVZ) 
1 40,164 Hardware 
- Loss of rate response 
- Premature battery depletion 
- Loss of telemetry 
60 3,301 2,742 
Physiological 
Patient Monitor/ 
Arrhythmia  
Detector/Alarm 
(MHX/DSI) 
10 38,394 Software 
- Incorrect dosage 
- Misaligned waveforms displayed 
- Delayed audible alarms 
- Failure to restart 
- Burn or electrical shock hazard  
4 79 276 
Pulse Oximeter 
(DQA) 1 14,964 Other 
- Incorrect messages/alarms 
- Overheating 
- Burn, electrical shock, or fire hazard 
1 0 1 
G
en
er
al
 
H
os
pi
ta
l 
Infusion Pump 
(FRN/LZH/ 
LKK/MEA) 
15 945,300 
Software - Incorrect safety alarms 
23 574 2,399 Hardware 
Battery 
- Delayed/over/under infusion 
- Infusion failure without alarms 
- Electrical shock, burn, or fire hazard 
Insulin Infusion 
Pump (LZG) 2 13,756 Battery 
- Insulin delivery failure 
- Unexpected shutdown w/o warning 0 4 15 
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V. DISCUSSION 
 
With growing costs of healthcare, technological advances in data gathering and computing are being 
employed to reduce the costs while offering high quality services. Medical devices are becoming smaller, 
more portable, and increasingly networked via both wired and wireless networks, to provide rapid access 
and remote patient monitoring. By relying on complex software, sophisticated hardware, batteries, 
sensors, and network communications, future medical devices face several challenges in terms of 
reliability, safety, and security: Increased complexity raises the possibility of component interaction 
accidents [6]; portability makes the devices more vulnerable to power outages; and interconnectedness 
increases the chance of error propagation and facing failure storms that devices will not be able to handle 
in a fail-safe manner.  Additionally, medical devices are prone to major security and privacy 
vulnerabilities such as unauthorized control of sensing and communication functions of devices and 
access to private patient data [7]. 
  
Our study found: 
• While software failures remain the major cause (64.3%) for recalls of computer-based medical 
devices, hardware, battery and I/O are also significant contributors to failures that can lead to 
potential life-critical hazards.  
• Hardware, battery, and I/O failures had a larger impact (57.3%) in terms of the number of devices 
affected by the recalls (almost 3 times) and the cost of device removals/repairs.  
• By looking at example safety-critical failures studied here (e.g., hardware defect that might lead 
to injection of hot fluid into patient's body shown in Table I) we see that many of the recalled 
devices were either designed without identifying and handling the safety issues or the safety 
mechanisms were not designed/implemented correctly.  
 
This emphasizes the importance of designs with well-defined safety requirements and implementations 
that employ robust error detection techniques and fail-safe mechanisms that are rigorously validated. In 
what follows we discuss major challenges in design of next-generation safety-critical medical devices. 
 
 
A. Hazard and Requirements Analysis  
 
Current hazard analysis techniques usually start with identifying possible hazards (See [8] for example 
hazard categories identified by FDA for infusion pumps) and safety requirements of system (See [9] for 
example safety requirements for a generic infusion pump model) based on an existing design. Most of the 
safety efforts are focused on checking and proving that design satisfies the safety requirements rather than 
performing a safety-driven design. Moreover, traditional safety analysis (such as Fault-tree Analysis 
(FTA) and Event Tree Analysis) and reliability techniques (such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA)) only focus on the reliability of individual components in the system and have limited capability 
in identifying other contributing factors to the system safety such as complex software errors, component 
interaction failures, human errors, complex decision-making, and flawed management in the design [6].  
 
[6] proposes a new hazard analysis method (STPA) for safety-driven design of future complex systems. In 
this method instead of checking the safety requirements of a completed design, the design process is 
treated as an optimization problem in which the identified hazards are translated into safety constraints on 
system states. These constraints are enforced by design of safety features to detect, control, and mitigate 
the hazards in the system while making trade-off between safety, performance and cost.  
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B. Error Detection and Validation 
 
Some residual faults/errors may escape even the most rigorous design and testing processes performed by 
manufacturers and manifest during the device's operation.  Catastrophic failures caused by hard to test 
corner cases could be prevented by robust techniques such as formal modeling and validation. Fault 
injection-based validation (especially symbolic fault-injection) of key failure modes of system is an 
example technique that has been applied to safety-critical systems such as air traffic control software and 
is proven to be successful in detecting corner cases that might evade the error detection [10]. 
Unintentional rebooting of system due to battery failures or integrated circuit errors (such as examples in 
Table II) can be detected before presenting harm to patients using runtime detection techniques such as 
runtime assertions, watchdog timers, self-test mechanisms and periodic system checks (e.g., for critical 
parts such as batteries, sensors, processor, and memory). The study reported in [11] demonstrates use of 
static program analysis for design of application-specific runtime assertions that can detect data errors 
leading to failures with high coverage and very low cost.  
 
C. Safety-based Design 
 
Despite measures to build highly robust devices, failures that impact patient safety will inevitably happen 
and full device removal may not be an acceptable option because of the cost for both patients and 
manufacturers. There are many well-understood fail-safe mechanisms and failure-recovery techniques 
used in modern computing systems that can be brought into medical devices in order to manage the 
failures at lower cost. For example battery or hardware failures leading to power loss could be managed 
by turning off power to unused components of the system to maintain power for the critical parts of 
device and avoid sudden power outages (e.g., sleep modes are used in modern embedded systems such as 
cell phones). Also techniques such as fault containment (used in aerospace and commercial systems) can 
be used for isolating the faulty units or components (e.g. damaged batteries) and moving the system into a 
fail-safe mode without presenting harm to patients/users. Online detection and reconfiguration strategies 
for switching to backup batteries or redundant hardware units in case of failure can be employed. For 
example, in the second recall in Table I, the uncontrolled movement of table was not stoppable even by 
disconnecting the power, since a backup battery was still providing power to the device. In this case, 
detection of a failure in the system before deciding on recovery to backup battery could prevent the 
potential patient injury.  
 
D. Recalls and Adverse Events Reporting  
 
FDA mechanisms for reporting recalls and adverse events by manufacturers can assist in preventing 
future adverse events through lessons learned from the earlier problems. However, current FDA databases 
for reporting recalls and adverse events suffer from underreporting, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies that 
make it difficult in many cases to identify the causes of failures and their impact on patients to determine 
how the design of future devices could be improved. The following are recommendations based on our 
study on how the reporting mechanisms could be improved:  
 
• Providing robust and systematic interfaces for reporting recalls and adverse events such that: 
• More accurate and complete information (e.g., Device Name, Product Code, and Product 
Problem) is entered in the reports.  
• List of keywords representing different Product Problems in the MAUDE database [2] more 
precisely reflects causes of device failures, especially computer-related failures. 
 
• Creating integrated databases of recalls and adverse events such that: 
• Product Name and Reason for Recall fields of each recall record correspond to standard device 
names, product codes, and device categories defined by the FDA 
• Recall records can be cross-referenced with related adverse event reports in MAUDE database 
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E. FDA's Role in Device Regulation and Approval 
 
FDA guidelines and safety recommendations (e.g., 2010 FDA initiative for external defibrillator 
improvement [12], 2010 industry guidance for infusion pumps [8], and 2013 guidance for pulse oximeters 
[13]) emphasize use of safety design and manufacturing practices, proper correction and communication 
of device problems by manufacturers, and better reporting and monitoring of adverse events to prevent 
the reoccurrence of failures, and enhance the resiliency of medical devices.  
 
FDA initiatives to harden life-critical devices such as infusion pumps and external defibrillators 
recommend introduction of formal mechanisms for improving premarket review and approval of devices. 
One FDA study [14] introduced the idea of developing usage models for different classes of devices to 
provide generic safety features and test cases that can be used by manufactures.  A more recent idea has 
involved the use of assurance cases for formal communication of claims, arguments, and evidences about 
devices from companies to the FDA. In the FDA guidance document for infusion pumps [8], 
manufacturers are specifically recommended to submit assurance case reports for the approval of devices. 
Adelard's ASCE software tool for creation and management of safety cases is currently used for the 
development of assurance cases for infusion pumps. In [15] a model-driven approach to derive assurance 
cases for cardiac pacemakers is proposed. 
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